Ok, it is late around here so I don't want to get into too
much detail about this right now. In fact, I'm sort of thinking
of writing a short article (like, newspaper/magazine article,
not law review article) about this because it is kind of funny,
but kind of sad, at the same time.
Anyway, as you've probably heard, President
Bush commuted Lewis "Scooter" Libby's 30-month prison term.
This means the conviction still stands. However, as the president
explained in his statement, "I respect the jury’s verdict
. . . But I have concluded that the prison sentence given
to Mr. Libby is excessive.”
So, the president, in exercising his constitutional discretion,
reduced Libby's sentence. If you'll remember, the reason Libby
got 30-months to begin with is because that was the low end
of the advisory sentencing guidelines range. Thus, the president
essentially downward departed in reaching Libby's sentence.
In fact, this represents a 100% departure. If the president
were a district court, almost any circuit court would reverse
his decision to depart so significantly.
In fact, Bush commuting Libby's sentence brings up an interesting
question: Does this case prove that there are situations where
a prison sentence within the advisory guidelines range is
unreasonable? Clearly the president here thought so. But what
about the Supreme Court's take.
Just two weeks ago, the Supreme Court in Rita
v. United States held that circuit courts could presume
sentences within the advisory guidelines range are reasonable.
The majority opinion explains:
[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the
time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence
on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission
will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence
in the particular case. That double determination significantly
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable
one.
Slip op. at 8. I'll have more to say about
Rita specifically
later, but for now, this makes me wonder about the president's
decision to commute.
In Libby's case, the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission clearly reached the same conclusion as to the proper
sentence. Thus, under the Supreme Court's interpretation,
the D.C. Circuit would be allowed to find that that sentence
is presumptively reasonable. (I'm not sure if the D.C. Circuit
has adopted such a standard, but my guess is that if it hasn't,
it soon will given Rita.) Does this mean that the president's
decision to commute, which represents a 100% departure from
the advisory guidelines sentence, is presumptively unreasonable?
The technical answer is no, because that's not what the Supreme
Court said; just because the guidelines are presumptively
reasonable does not necessarily mean that nonguidelines sentences
are presumptively unreasonable. In reality, however, I would
argue that the presumptively unreasonable standard is closer
to the truth. Circuit courts demand district courts thoroughly
justify departures based on 3553(a) factors to an extent not
required of guidelines range sentences. Moreover, you would
be hard pressed to find any circuit court that would agree
reducing a 2 and 1/2 year sentence to 0 months is "reasonable,"
no matter the 3553(a) justifications. (I would say a circuit
court has never done this, but there might have been some
early post-Booker cases that did this, and I have no
desire to research this right now. However, I think now, almost
3 years after Booker no circuit court would do that.)
So who is right? Does this case prove that there are situations
where the guidelines are not reasonable (and thus illustrating
that the "presumptively reasonable" standard is flawed by
giving too much deference to the guidelines in practice)?
If not, has the president proven that his decision is unreasonable
under the law, but that he is going to ignore the law to help
a brother out? I dunno, I'm too tired to think about it right
now.
Right, so the point is I think it is kind of funny that President
Bush's commuting of Libby's sentence could be considered unreasonable
under Supreme Court precedent. (Although obviously the president's
power to commute is not subject to judicial review.) I also
wonder if the president would have agreed with a district
court that had similarly reduced a sentence from 30 to 0 months
based on 3553(a) factors, or whether he would have used it
as yet another example of liberal, activist judges.
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