Ok, it is late around here so I don't want to get into too much detail about this right now. In fact, I'm sort of thinking of writing a short article (like, newspaper/magazine article, not law review article) about this because it is kind of funny, but kind of sad, at the same time.
Anyway, as you've probably heard, President Bush commuted Lewis "Scooter" Libby's 30-month prison term. This means the conviction still stands. However, as the president explained in his statement, "I respect the jury’s verdict . . . But I have concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive.”
So, the president, in exercising his constitutional discretion, reduced Libby's sentence. If you'll remember, the reason Libby got 30-months to begin with is because that was the low end of the advisory sentencing guidelines range. Thus, the president essentially downward departed in reaching Libby's sentence. In fact, this represents a 100% departure. If the president were a district court, almost any circuit court would reverse his decision to depart so significantly.
In fact, Bush commuting Libby's sentence brings up an interesting question: Does this case prove that there are situations where a prison sentence within the advisory guidelines range is unreasonable? Clearly the president here thought so. But what about the Supreme Court's take.
Just two weeks ago, the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States held that circuit courts could presume sentences within the advisory guidelines range are reasonable. The majority opinion explains:
[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.
Slip op. at 8. I'll have more to say about
Rita specifically later, but for now, this makes me wonder about the president's decision to commute.
In Libby's case, the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission clearly reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence. Thus, under the Supreme Court's interpretation, the D.C. Circuit would be allowed to find that that sentence is presumptively reasonable. (I'm not sure if the D.C. Circuit has adopted such a standard, but my guess is that if it hasn't, it soon will given Rita.) Does this mean that the president's decision to commute, which represents a 100% departure from the advisory guidelines sentence, is presumptively unreasonable? The technical answer is no, because that's not what the Supreme Court said; just because the guidelines are presumptively reasonable does not necessarily mean that nonguidelines sentences are presumptively unreasonable. In reality, however, I would argue that the presumptively unreasonable standard is closer to the truth. Circuit courts demand district courts thoroughly justify departures based on 3553(a) factors to an extent not required of guidelines range sentences. Moreover, you would be hard pressed to find any circuit court that would agree reducing a 2 and 1/2 year sentence to 0 months is "reasonable," no matter the 3553(a) justifications. (I would say a circuit court has never done this, but there might have been some early post-Booker cases that did this, and I have no desire to research this right now. However, I think now, almost 3 years after Booker no circuit court would do that.)
So who is right? Does this case prove that there are situations where the guidelines are not reasonable (and thus illustrating that the "presumptively reasonable" standard is flawed by giving too much deference to the guidelines in practice)? If not, has the president proven that his decision is unreasonable under the law, but that he is going to ignore the law to help a brother out? I dunno, I'm too tired to think about it right now.
Right, so the point is I think it is kind of funny that President Bush's commuting of Libby's sentence could be considered unreasonable under Supreme Court precedent. (Although obviously the president's power to commute is not subject to judicial review.) I also wonder if the president would have agreed with a district court that had similarly reduced a sentence from 30 to 0 months based on 3553(a) factors, or whether he would have used it as yet another example of liberal, activist judges.
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